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AN OBSOLETE LAW OF WAR
AN OBSOLETE LAW OF WAR
BY EL3RIDGE COLBY*
TrHEORISTS say that war is growing more and more humane
from day to day, and that more and more restrictions are
being imposed by international regulation upon the damage
done by armed conflict. There are other, more practical
men who deny the validity of such an interpretation and
point to the mobilized resources of modern combatants and the
modern wearing-out processes of war today. There is the
new theory of economic pressure. There is also the exhausting
policy of attrition and exhaustion of manpower, by which the
nations hoped to gain eventual advantage in the last struggle. Far
different this from the wars of the eighteenth century when sol-
diers were professional soldiers and international conflicts were
largely confined to the polite maneuvers of professional armies,
when it was a social error to leave winter quarters and attack an
enemy unready, when opposing commanders were given
passes to cross the enemy lines on their way home during
the closed season.
Not only in that strategy which is directed from the Home
office and the General Staff, is the change apparent, but also in
tactics which govern on the field in the face of the enemy. A single
example will be illuminating. It will perhaps cause some to
consider whether or not there be truth in the words of Buckle,
who said: "Things march slowly but the issue is not the less
certain, and the time will assuredly come when all vestiges
of barbarism will disappear." It will at any rate serve to
illustrate in one detail how the conduct of war has altered in
the last century. The instances are all drawn from experiences
familiar to the armed forces of the United States.
In 1812, when the American and British forces were fac-
ing one another across No Man's Water, if I may invent the
phrase, there ensued an interesting exchange of correspond-
ence between the opposing commanders. General Hull, later
to surrender Detroit, wrote on July 6th, to the British com-
mander St. George, saying:
*Captain of Infantry, United States Army.
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"Since the arrival of my army at this encampment (five
o'clock P. M. yesterday) I have been informed that a number
of discharges of artillery and of small arms have been made
by some of the militia, from this shore into Sandwich. I
regret to have received such information, the proceeding was
unauthorized by me ... "-
To this St. George replied:
"I am honored with your letter of this days date; I per-
fectly coincide with you in opinion respecting private proper-
ty, and any wanton attack upon unoffending individuals, and
am happy to find, what I was certain would be the case, that
the aggression in question was unauthorized by you ... "2
A short time later, on another portion of the frontier, a
similar exchange of letters took place, demonstrating the at-
titude of those times even more explicitly: Van Rensselaer
at Lewiston sent the following across the Niagara River to
Brock at Fort George on September 20th:
"It was with extreme regret and concern that I yesterday
learned through Lieut. Col. Myers, that in a repetition of the
practice of firing between sentinels, which I have so peremp-
torily prohibited, one shot has proved fatal to a man at the
lime kilns on the Canada shore....
"Persons not under immediate command in either army,
who, occasionally, approach the river, discharge their pieces,
at the sentries, and then escape unobserved in their retreats,
while the fire, thus begun, is returned upon an unoffending
sentinel. .... 
And to this General Brock answered, in all courtesy, three
days later:
"I never doubted for a moment that the firing from your
side of the river, upon individuals, was contrary to your in-
tentions, and in violation of your orders, and I beg leave to
repeat, that every effort shall be made on my part to prevent
the recurrence of such acts of insubordination on this
sid e. .. .. 4
Such was a convention of war in those times, a custom of
war, a law of war, since the laws of war are but tangible
descriptions of customs and conventions which belligerents
seek to maintain. It was a polite fashion of gentlemanly
officers, to reprobate scattered shooting at enemy individuals,
except on the occasion of actual combats of sufficient dimen-
'British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812. 1 Champlain So-
ciety Publications, No. xiii. Toronto, 1920, pp. 366-367.21bid, p. 367.
3Ibid, pp. 594-595.
4Ibid, pp. 595-596.
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sions to be called engagements between forces. It was a con-
tinuation of the eighteenth century conception of open and
closed seasons for fighting. War to those people was to be
a clash of armies, not an accumulation of individual acts of
extermination.
The theory persisted. During the Civil War, between
1861-1865, the picking off of separate sentries was regarded as
"a very barbarous and savage practice,"5 and the Lieber In-
structions which reduced current practice to writing, declared
unequivocally:
"Outposts, sentinels, or pickets are not to be fired upon
except to drive them in, or when a positive order, special or
general, has been issued to that effect." 6
"Modern wars are not internecine wars, in which the killing
of the enemy is the object. . . . Unnecessary or revengeful
destruction of life is not lawful."
7
This was the doctrine, and ifivestigation seems to bear
testimony that it was applied to a great degree. There were
exceptions.8
A surgeon wrote home:
"We had some picket firing during the night, but it is be-
lieved to have proceeded from the nervous excitability of our
own men, rather than any real danger of an attack." 9
General Longstreet speaks of a night in September, 1862,
just on the eve of the battle of Antietam, when the troops
were actually moving into position preparatory to the next
day's clash:
"The troops along either line were near enough to hear
voices from the other side, and several spats occurred during
5Russell, W. H., My Diary North and South, 343; 2 Stowell and
Monroe, International Cases, 190. Also condemned by General McClellan,
June 23, 1861, in a proclamation, G. B. McClellan, Report of the Army
of the Potomac, p. 21.6General Order No. 100, A. G. 0., 1863, art. 69, cf. "Pickets . . .
should fire only when the enemy approaches resolutely," in Regulations
for Field Service, U.S. Cav. (1861) p. 63.
7Ibid, art. 68. On the C. & 0. Canal, there was a local agreement
to this effect, in 1862, and it was the practice before Petersburg in 1863.
Carter, R. G., Four Brothers in Blue, ch. vii, (pp. 36-7), ch. xvml, (pp.
459-462).
8" 'All quiet along the Potomac,' they say,
Except now and then a stray picket
Is shot as he -walks on his beat to and fro,
By a rifleman hid in the thicket . . .
The Picket Guard, by Ethel Lynn Beers.9Stevenson, B.F., Letters from the Army, p. 80. (Written from
Powell's Valley, Kentucky, June 12, 1862.)
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the night between the pickets, increasing in one instance to
the exchange of many shots."'1
In the midst of an active campaign the following incident
occurred, on the night of June 4th, 1864, near Petersburg:
"One of the pickets on the right, hearing a noise in the
bushes, challenged and was answered by a shot. He instantly
fired. . . . Several others fired at the flash, thus revealing
the position of nearly half the posts.""
Another incident is related as follows:
"Our camp was roused this morning at three o'clock, witl-
the information that the pickets had been driven in and that
the enemy were advancing on us in force .... It turned out
that one of the pickets had fired on what he thought a prowl-
ing straggler within our lines.' 12
It is to be noted that practically all of these occasions were
mentioned as exceptional incidents. The firing of the pickets
was invariably connected with the idea of an advance in force,
with the beginning of an engagement,-all in conformity with
the spirit of the Lieber Instructions,-or else simply attribut-
ed to nervousness and touchiness of sentinels. The very fact
that these isolated instances are mentioned in the war-time
memories of the recorders thereof is fairly good evidence
that they were unusual. Similar firing is spoken of in connec-
tion with the siege of Vicksburg when infantry firing con-
tinued most of the day, as might be expected in siege opera-
tions where one side attempts to hinder the entrenching and
sapping of the other.13 The whole tactics of a siege implies
such firing. The defender must be picked off when he at-
tempts to repair the damage done to his ramparts by shell or
mine. The attacker must be discouraged as much as possible
from pushing forward his ditches and trenches, and the best
discouragement is to make him keep his head down and shoot
at every head that appears. It is to be expected that in any-
thing approaching sieges such things will go on. During the
semi-siege conditions in the vicinity of Cold Harbor, this
was the common practice:
"As a rule everything was quiet except the picket firing,
which could not be prevented when the men were so close
'OLongstreet, J., From Manassas to Appomatox, 238.
"Anon., A Dark Night on Picket, 5 Overland Monthly, July, 1870,p. 31.2Stevenson, B.F., Letters from the Army, 73. (Written from Moss
House, Knox Co., Ky., 1862.)
13Ibid, p. 230.
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together.. . . The picket firing ceased only during the oc-
casional truces to bury the dead.
'14
Nevertheless, although there were occurrences of this sort,
in view of the passages from the Lieber Instructions, and in
view of the specific character of the few discoverable occa-
sions when picket firing did not go on and the way in which
it was emphatically reprobated, it is perhaps safe to say that
the former convention, custom, and the law of war in this
regard still had validity and strength.
What of the World War?
Ask any soldier who served in France. Find out if they
kept their heads down in approach and fire trenches, and dis-
cover why. Tommy Atkins may have called the sniper a
"Body Snatcher"' '1 5 and yet both British and French joined
the Germans in selecting and developing good shots whose
main occupation was to pick off unwary individuals over in
the enemy lines." The thing developed into a regular tradi-
tion. Enemy snipers grew to have nicknames and to be
spoken of as characteristic individuals, though one sincere
effort followed another in attempts to shoot that elusive and
clever fellow who fired so effectively from behind that dis-
tant hummock of clay.17  Sniping "did not exist as an or-
ganized thing at the beginning of the war" and there was no
provision on the British military "establishment" for indi-
viduals to be detailed on such work or for officers to train and
direct groups to that purpose.18 Yet the work soon became
organized. Special training was given.19 Special equipment
was procured, camouflage devices, telescopic sights for long
range work, and armor plates with appropriate loop-holes
and covers.2 0  Far from being reprobated, the picking off of
enemy individuals was eagerly sought as a means of reducing
the hostile manpower and lowering enemy morale, as well
14Dana, C. A., Recollections of the Civil War, 214.
1'Empey, A. G., Over the Top, 129.
16Ibid, pp. 161, 309; Empey, A. G., First Call, 191, 222; Musgrave,
C. C., Under Four Flags for France, 363; Belmont, F., A Crusader of
France, pp. 96, 220, 255.
'.Montague, C. E., Disenchantment, 179-180; Hesketh-Pritchard, H. V.,
Sniping in France, 28; Musgrave, C. C., Under Four Flags for France,
171. 18Hesketh-Pritchard, H. V., Sniping in France, 9, 25.
19Sgt. R. J. McSwiney, in The American Magazine, 1919; and officially
in Notes for Infantry Officers on Trench Warfare, compiled by the
British General Staff, 48.
20Ibid, p. 9, cf. Also: Empey, A. G., First Call, 223, 224, 225; Kirby,
Win., Manual of Camouflage, 39, 71, 94, par. 9, 41, 59.
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as a means of interfering with his observation and construc-
tion. The program was developed and carried out on a defi-
nite theory, which has been stated as follows by that British
officer probably primarily responsible for the British efficiency
in this work, a theory accepted by the Allies as a whole:
"Now if each battalion in the line killed by sniping a single
German in the day, the numbers would mount up. If anyone
cares to do a mathematical sum, and to work out the number
of battalions we had in the line, they will be surprised at
the figures, and when they multiply those figures by thirty
and look at the month's losses, they will find that in a war of
attrition the sniper on this count alone justifies his existence
and wipes out-large numbers of the enemy. But it is not only
by the casualties that one can judge the value of sniping.
If your trench is dominated by enemy snipers, life in it is
really a very bad thing, and morale must inevitably suffer."'2'
Such was the practice in the last war, where on one oc-
casion a British battalion lost in a single day eighteen men
through the effective sniping of Germans who did not hesi-
tate to fire upon individuals. 2 That is the reason we can
speak of the understanding between the officers who wrote
so nicely to one another in 1812 and the principles enunciated
in the Lieber Instructions on the same point, as now little
more than an obsolete law of war.
2lHesketh-Pritchard, H. V., Sniping in France, 2.
22Ibid, p. 2. cf. also the teaching of the new rule to green troops as
related by a participant, Smith, J. S., Over There and Back, 49, and the
Feb. 5, 1918 instructions to the First Division, A. E. F.: "There are no
orders which require us to wait for the enemy to fire on us before we
fire on him; do not wait for him to fire first." History of the First
Division, p. 48.
